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The ways in which natural selection can allow the proliferation of co-
operative behavior have long been seen as a central problem in evo-
lutionary biology. Most of the literature has focused on interactions
between pairs of individuals and on linear public goods games. This
emphasis led to the conclusion that even modest levels of migration
would pose a serious problem to the spread of altruism in group struc-
tured populations. Here we challenge this conclusion, by analyzing
evolution in a framework which allows for complex group interactions
and random migration among groups. We conclude that contingent
forms of strong altruism can spread when rare under realistic group
sizes and levels of migration. Our analysis combines group-centric
and gene-centric perspectives, allows for arbitrary strength of selec-
tion, and leads to extensions of Hamilton’s rule for the spread of
altruistic alleles, applicable under broad conditions.
natural selection | population genetics | evolutionary game theory | group se-
lection | kin selection | altruism | Hamilton’s rule | iterated public goods
game
1. Introduction
The evolution of cooperation and altruism are fundamental
scientific challenges highlighted by their role in the major tran-
sitions in life’s history, when natural selection acted simulta-
neously on several competing levels [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
In this context, the relevance of basic concepts, includ-
ing group selection and Hamilton’s rule remain controversial
[9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Here we address these prob-
lems by studying a framework for evolution in group struc-
tured populations that incorporates inter- and intra-group
competition and migration. Combining group-centric with
gene-centric perspectives in a constructive group/kin selection
approach, we build methodology that allows for the analysis of
arbitrary non-linear fitness functions, resulting from complex
multi-individual interactions across life cycles. We obtain the
conditions for a rare social allele to invade the population.
This is obtained in a mathematically rigorous way, by ana-
lyzing the stability of the equilibrium in which this allele is
absent. This analysis is done for arbitrary strength of se-
lection, but when selection is weak and groups are large the
condition for invasion simplifies significantly into a form that
is easy to apply and provides substantial intuition. In the case
of linear fitness functions, the condition for invasion is iden-
tical to Hamilton’s rule, and it is natural to regard the more
general non-linear cases as generalizations of that rule. Our
results also show that one of the most widely used approaches
to analyzing kin selection models, [18], [7] (condition (6.7)),
and [16] (Box 6), yields incorrect results in some biologically
relevant situations.
Our results reveal biologically realistic conditions under
which altruism can evolve when rare, but genetic relatedness
in groups is modest. In this way we challenge a common
understanding according to which inter-group selection favor-
ing altruism could only override intra-group selection favoring
selfishness under exceptional conditions, namely small group
size and very low migration rates [13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27]. We identify the emphasis on linear public
goods games in the literature, including most of these papers,
as having supported this belief. In contrast, we show that for
iterated public goods games, in which altruists cooperate or
not in each round based on previous outcomes [28, 31], altru-
ism can spread even when groups are large, selection is weak
and migration rates are substantially larger than the inverse
of group size. This result corrects [31], who predicted that
large group size would not allow cooperation to spread when
rare in this model. For species that live in groups, several vital
group activities repeat themselves periodically and behavior
changes as feedback is obtained from previous iterations. The
iterated public goods game that we study is therefore often
more realistic than a simple one shot public goods game. A
proper analysis of this model fills therefore an important gap
in the literature. To obtain our result we show that in the
absence of selection, when groups are large, the fraction of
group members that are close relatives of a randomly chosen
individual has a non-Gaussian distribution with a fat tail. As
a consequence, even when altruistic alleles are rare in the pop-
ulation, they have a significant probability of concentrating in
some groups, accruing substantial reproductive gains through
multi-individual synergy.
2. The two-level Fisher-Wright framework
When members of a species live in groups, their reproductive
success depends on the behavior of all group members. More
efficient groups may grow faster and split, outcompeting the
less efficient ones that die out. On the other hand, individ-
uals may free ride on the cooperation of other members of
their group, and in this way outcompete them. This picture
is further complicated by migration among groups. The Two-
level Fisher-Wright framework with selection and migration
(2lFW) captures all these elements, in a simplified fashion. In
2lFW haploid individuals live in a large number g of groups
of size n, and are of two genetically determined phenotypic
types, A or N. Generations do not overlap, reproduction is
asexual and the type is inherited by the offspring. (Mutations
will be considered briefly later.) The relative fitness (w) of
a type A, and that of a type N, in a group that has k types
A, are, respectively, wAk = 1 + δv
A
k and w
N
k = 1 + δv
N
k , with
the convention that vN0 = 0, i.e., w
N
0 = 1. The quantities
vAk and v
N
k represent life-cycle payoffs derived from behavior,
physiology, etc. The parameter δ ≥ 0 indicates the strength
of selection. Fig. 1 describes the creation of a new genera-
tion in the 2lFW through inter- and intra- group competition,
followed by migration at rate m.
Cases in which types A behave in some altruistic fashion
are of particular interest [33]. Most of the literature concerns
the very special case of a linear public goods game (PG), de-
fined by vAk = −C + B(k − 1)/(n − 1), v
N
k = Bk/(n − 1),
0 < C < B, in which each type A cooperates, at a cost C to
herself, providing a benefit B shared by the other members
of her group. The need to consider more complex intra-group
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interactions and non-linear payoff functions is, nevertheless,
well known [10, 14, 28, 30, 29, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42, 43]. Non-linearities appear naturally whenever activi-
ties involve many group members simultaneously. They result
from threshold phenomena, increasing returns to scale, satu-
ration, etc. For instance, to hunt large prey may require a
large minimum number of hunters, the likelihood of success
may first increase rapidly with the number of hunters, but it
may plateau when this number becomes very large. Allowing
for the analysis of such synergistic multi-individual interac-
tions and activities is a central feature of our approach, dis-
tinguishing it from theoretical frameworks based on pairwise
interactions, or single actors benefiting a group [4, 44, 45].
Fig. 1. Diagram of the 2lFW process. (Left) FW inter-
group competition: Each group in the new generation independently de-
scends from a group in the previous generation, with probabilities proportional to
group average fitness w¯k =
kwA
k
+(n−k)wN
k
n
. (Center) FW Intra-
group competition: If a group descends from a group with k types A, then
it will have i types A with probability P (k, i) = bin(i |n, kwAk /nw¯k), where the
binomial probability bin(i|n, q) is the probability of i successes in n independent
trials, each with probability q of success. (Right) Migration: Once the new
g groups have been formed according to the two-level competition process, a random
fractionm of the individuals migrates. Migrants are randomly shuffled. Note: The
assignment of relative fitness to the groups in the fashion done above is a necessary
and sufficient condition [32] for individuals in the parental generation to have each
an expected number of offspring proportional to their personal relative fitness.
The 2lFW framework can be seen as a generalization of
the trait-group framework (see Sec. 2.3.2 of [5]), which cor-
responds to the case m = 1. One can interpret 1 −m as an
assortment parameter. Because migration is completely ran-
dom in 2lFW, this assortment represents a worst case scenario,
abstracting away additional assortment caused by kin recog-
nition, greenbeard effects, selective acceptance of migrants,
joint migration of individuals, etc. It is well known [28, 31, 36]
that even when m = 1 non-linearities in fitness functions al-
low for coexistence of cooperators and defectors. But under
the strong altruism condition vAk+1 < v
N
k (meaning that each
type A would be better off mutating into a type N), this is not
the case [33, 46]. One of our goals is to determine the level of
migration compatible with invasion by rare strong altruists.
The 2lFW also generalizes the “typical kin selection
model” of [47], where the payoffs were those of PG, and the
analysis relied on this and on the assumption of weak selec-
tion. That paper was a response to [48], where group selec-
tion was argued to be an important mechanism for the evolu-
tion of cooperation, and a multilevel selection model based on
Moran’s model was introduced. Our analysis of 2lFW with
non-linear fitness functions highlights the importance of com-
bining group-centric with gene-centric perspectives, and shows
that group selection can be an important force in evolution
under realistic conditions. It also shows that mathematically
rigorous analysis can be carried out even when selection is
strong and fitness functions are non-linear. And it shows that
one has to be very careful in applying mathematically non-
rigorous methodology, as it can produce substantially incor-
rect results, even when selection is weak.
3. A basic example: Iterated public goods game
Non-linearities in life-cycle payoffs can result from activities
repeating themselves during a lifetime, and behavior being
contingent on previous outcomes. A basic example is the it-
erated public goods game (IPG) [28, 31]. In IPG a PG is
repeated an average of T times in a life-cycle. We will sup-
pose that types N never cooperate, while types A cooperate
in the first round and later cooperate only if at least a frac-
tion α of group members cooperated in the previous round.
Mathematically, this model generalizes the iterated prisoner
dilemma and tit-for-tat, from the dyadic setting of [49] and
[50] to the multi-individual setting. But while direct or in-
direct reciprocity requires the identification of individuals in
the group, this is not the case here. The behavior of types A
in the IPG can be triggered by individuals simply discontinu-
ing cooperative behavior when previous cooperation produced
negative feedback to them. In other words, allele A can pre-
dispose individuals to cooperate, but as they do it and obtain
feedback from that behavior, they may continue it or discon-
tinue it. The IPG is in this sense closely related to generalized
reciprocity mechanisms [51] with low cognitive requirements.
Negative feedback from cooperation should occur if the frac-
tion of group members that cooperated was less than C/B,
but not if it was larger than that threshold, since in the for-
mer case the payoff to a cooperator is negative, while in the
latter case it is positive. This gives a special role to the value
α = C/B. If α ≤ C/B, the behavior of types A is altru-
istic in the strong sense that each type A individual would
increase its fitness if it behaved as a type N, everything else
being equal, i.e., vAk+1 < v
N
k (see SI Appendix (Section 8) for
a detailed discussion). Moreover, types N always free ride and
have greater fitness than types A in the same group, regard-
less of the values of α and T , i.e., vAk < v
N
k . Fig. 2 displays
a detailed analysis of some instances of the IPG, giving con-
ditions for allele A to spread when rare. For many species
that live and interact in groups for many years, several vital
activities, including collective hunting and food sharing, can
repeat themselves hundreds or thousands of times in a life-
cycle, giving plausibility to the values of T in Fig. 2. (The as-
sumption that individuals discontinue behavior after a single
unsuccessful participation is a simplification. When this is not
a realistic assumption, one can interpret the parameter T as
the ratio between the typical number of repetitions of the ac-
tivity and the typical number of unsuccessful attempts before
cooperation is discontinued by a type A.) Panel C, in which
selection is weak and groups are large, shows two important
contrasting results. When T = 1, and the IPG is identical to
the PG, allele A can only invade under Hamilton’s condition
R = FST > C/B. But as T increases, the level of relatedness
needed for invasion drops substantially, so that for modest val-
ues of B/C, allele A can invade under R = FST significantly
lower than 10%, compatible with levels observed in several
species, including humans [27] (Table 8.3), [42], [52] (Tables
6.4 and 6.5), [53], [54] (Table 4.9). The corresponding number
of migrants per group per generation, nm = (1−R)/(2R), can
be of the order of 10. Further examples showing the spread of
altruism and cooperation under high levels of gene flow and
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low levels of relatedness are provided in Figs. 5, 6, 7, 8, 20
and 21 in the SI Appendix.
Fig. 2. Iterated public goods game (IPG). A public goods game
(PG) is repeated an average of T times in a life-cycle. In each round each indi-
vidual can cooperate at a cost C to herself, producing a benefit B shared by the
other members of the group. Types N never cooperate, while types A cooperate in
the first round and later cooperate only if at least a fraction α of group members
cooperated in the previous round. In all panels α = C/B (types A are strongly
altruistic) and curves correspond to T = 1 (black, this case is identical to PG),
10 (blue), 100 (magenta), 1000 (green) (bottom to top in Panel A, top to bot-
tom in Panels B and C). Panel A: C = 1, B = 3, n = 50. Curves give
the critical migration rate ms below which types A proliferate when rare, and that
solves ρ(ms) = 1, or equivalently ∆p = 0 in (1). (The subscript ‘s’ stands for
‘survival’.) The dependence of ms on the strength of selection δ indicates the rele-
vance of studying both weak and strong selection. Short horizontal red lines indicate
value of ms under weak selection, obtained from setting ∆p = 0 in (2) (note the
excellent agreement). Panel B: Again, C = 1, B = 3, n = 50. Curves
give the critical relatedness R0s = R
0(ms) above which types A proliferate. Here
R0(m) = (1−m)2/(n− (n−1)(1−m)2 ) ≈ 1/(1+2nm) is the related-
ness obtained from neutral genetic markers. Short horizontal red lines are again from
∆p = 0 in (2). Panel C: Limit of large n under weak selection. Critical values of
relatedness R = FST = 1/(1 + 2nm), as function of C/B. Solid lines provide
the solution to the equation C/B − R = (T − 1)R(1 − C/B)1/R derived
from setting ∆p = 0 in (3). Dashed lines give its approximation (5). Red vertical
line corresponds to C/B = 1/3, while horizontal red lines are at the same level
of those from Panel B. Their intersections illustrate the fact that both the solid and
dashed lines in Panel C are good approximations to weak-selection values of critical
relatedness, R0s , when n = 50.
4. Condition for invasion under strong selection
To analyze the 2lFW, denote by fk(t), k = 0, ..., n the frac-
tion of groups in generation t that have exactly k types A.
Denote by p(t) =
∑n
k=1(k/n)fk(t) the frequency of types A
in the population. The state of the population in genera-
tion t is described by the vector f(t) = (f1(t), ..., fn(t)), since
f0(t) = 1−
∑n
k=1 fk(t). We will suppose that g >> n, so that,
by the law of large numbers, f(t) evolves as a deterministic
(non-linear) dynamical system in dimension n. Here we will
study its linearization close to the fixed point (0, ..., 0), with
no types A. This means that we are restricting ourselves to
the case in which p << 1, and studying the conditions for
allele A to invade the population when rare. With notation
introduced in Fig. 1, we have then f(t+ 1) = f(t)M(A+B),
whereMk,i = w¯k P (k, i), Ai,j = bin(j | i, 1−m) and Bi,j = m,
if j = 1, Bi,j = 0 if j 6= 1. MatrixM represents the production
of groups in the new generation, through the two-level com-
petition. Matrix A represents the effect of types A migrating
out of groups, and matrix B represents the effect of these mi-
grant types A joining groups that previous to migration had
no types A. (When p << 1, the migrant types A are a small
fraction of the migrant population, and therefore each one is
likely to settle in a different group that had no types A before
migration.) A standard application of the Perron-Frobenius
Theorem implies that when t >> 1, we have, in good approx-
imation, f(t) = Cρtν, where C is a constant that depends on
f(0), ρ > 0 is the leading eigenvalue of M(A + B) and ν is
its corresponding left-eigenvector normalized as a probability
vector. This means that, regardless of the initial distribution
f(0), with 0 < p(0) << 1, demographics and natural selec-
tion drive f(t) towards multiples of ν, in what can be seen
as self-organization of copies of A in the optimal stable way
for them to spread. Once this has happened, p(t) grows at
rate ρ. Consequently, allele A will proliferate, when rare, if
the viability condition ρ > 1 holds, and it will vanish if ρ < 1.
(See Fig. 2 and SI Appendix (Sections 1 and 2) for applica-
tions, illustrations and further explanations.) When ρ > 1,
even if allele A is initially absent, a small rate of mutation
will introduce it, allowing it to then invade the population.
In the terminology of evolutionary game theory (see, e.g., [27]
Chapter 7), phenotype N is an evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS) when ρ < 1 and N is not an ESS when ρ > 1.
The viability condition ρ > 1 has a gene-centric (kin-
selection) interpretation in terms of average (neighbor modu-
lated) fitnesses. For this purpose, define ∆p(t) = p(t + 1) −
p(t). Then it is well known that W¯∆p = p(WA − W¯ ) =
p(1 − p)(WA − WN), where WA and WN are the average
fitnesses of types A and N, and W¯ = pWA + (1 − p)WN is
the average fitness of all individuals. If we choose a random
type A, it will have probability proportional to kfk of being
in a group with exactly k types A (Bayesian sampling bias).
ThereforeWA = 1+δ
∑n
k=1 kfkv
A
k /
∑n
k=1 kfk. When p << 1,
if we choose a random individual, it is likely to be in a group
with no types A. Therefore, in good approximation, W¯ = 1.
Since f(t) is driven towards multiples of ν, we obtain
∆p = p δ
∑n
k=1 kνkv
A
k∑n
k=1 kνk
, [1]
provided p << 1 and t >> 1 (the error term is of order p2 +
βt, with 0 < β < 1). The viability condition ρ > 1 can also be
stated as ∆p > 0, in (1). It is important to observe that p(t)
does not need to be monotone, and that ∆p > 0 is the proper
condition for invasion only when, as in (1), one is considering
the stationary regime, t >> 1.
5. Weak selection
If selection is weak, i.e., δ << 1, migration acts much
faster than selection, providing a separation of time scales
[3, 47, 55, 56, 57]. This allows us to replace ν in (1) with ν0,
obtained by assuming δ = 0. Algebraic simplifications (pre-
sented in SI Appendix (Section 5)) allow us then to rewrite
the neighbor modulated fitness relation (1) in the form
∆p = p δ
n∑
k=1
pikv
A
k [2]
(the error term is of order δ2), where piQ = pi and
∑n
k=1 pik =
1, with
Qi,j = Bi,j + (1−m) bin(j − 1 |n− 1 , (1−m)i/n).
The Markov transition matrix Q and its invariant distribution
pi have natural interpretations in terms of identity by descent
(IBD) under neutral genetic drift, as we explain next when
we provide a second derivation of (2).
Two individuals are said to be IBD if following their lin-
eages back in time, they coalesce before a migration event
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affects either one. The separation of time scales implies that
when selection acts, the demographic distribution is well ap-
proximated by that obtained in equilibrium with δ = 0. This
means that in good approximation WA = 1 + δ
∑
k pikv
A
k ,
where pik is the δ = 0 equilibrium probability that in the
group of a randomly chosen focal type A there are exactly k
types A (focal included). But because we are supposing that
types A are rare, the only individuals that are type A in this
group are those that are IBD to the focal, so that pik is also the
probability that exactly k individuals in this group are IBD to
the focal. As in the derivation of (1), since types A are rare,
we have W¯ = 1 and hence ∆p = p(WA− 1) = δp
∑n
k=1 pikv
A
k ,
which is (2).
To compute pi, we will use the standard Kronecker nota-
tion δj,i = 1 if j = i and δj,i = 0 if j 6= i. Now, the probability
pij that the focal is IBD to exactly j−1 other members of her
group is δj,1 if the focal is a migrant (probability m), while if
she is not a migrant (probability 1−m), then we have to con-
sider how many individuals in her mother’s group were IBD
to her mother. If, counting her mother, that number was i
(probability pii, assuming demographic equilibrium) then the
probability that the focal is IBD to exactly j − 1 other mem-
bers of her group is equal to the probability that of the n− 1
other members of her group, exactly j − 1 are non-migrants
who chose for mother one of the i candidates (among n pos-
sibilities) that were IBD to the focal’s mother (probability
bin(j−1|n−1, (1−m)i/n)). Combining these pieces, we have
pij = mδj,1 + (1−m)
n∑
i=1
pii bin(j − 1|n − 1, (1−m)i/n).
This is exactly the same as the set of equations piQ = pi.
The IBD distribution pi contains all the relevant informa-
tion about genetic relatedness in the groups, including and ex-
ceeding that given by the average relatedness between group
members, R = (1 − m)2/(n − (n − 1)(1 − m)2), obtained
from lineages, regression coefficients, or Wright’s FST statis-
tics. Specifically, we can define R as the probability that a
second member chosen from the focal’s group is IBD to the
focal and then obtain (from linearity of expected values) that
R = ((
∑n
k=1 kpik)− 1)/(n− 1) is a linear function of pi’s first
moment. When vAk is a non-linear function of k, more in-
formation contained in pi, including its higher moments, are
needed to decide whether ∆p > 0 in (2). It is important to
also stress that (2) can be easily used for applications in which
even the knowledge of all the moments of pi (see [55]) would
be cumbersome to apply, as for instance in the computation
of the short horizontal red lines in Fig. 2, Panels A and B.
6. Large groups under weak selection
The stationarity condition pi = piQ allows for a recursive com-
putation of all the moments of pi (see SI Appendix (Section
5)). These moments can then be used to show the power-
ful result that if n is large and m is small, then pi, when
properly rescaled, is close to a beta distribution, with mean
R = FST (see SI Appendix (Section 6)). In this case, if in
addition to the assumption of weak selection, also vAk is well
approximated by v˜Ak/n, for some piecewise continuous function
v˜Ax , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, then (2) takes the easy to apply form
∆p = p δ
(
1
R
− 1
)∫ 1
0
(1− x)
1
R
−2 v˜Ax dx, [3]
where R = 1
1+2nm
. Equations (1) and (3) play complemen-
tary roles in the analysis of 2lFW. Both provide the condition
for invasion by allele A; (1) holds in full generality, while (3)
requires special assumptions (small δ, large n), but is compu-
tationally much simpler and provides a great deal of intuition,
as we discuss next.
Equation (3) should be contrasted with what [31] pre-
dicted by supposing that the number of individuals in a group
that are IBD to a focal individual would be well approxi-
mated by a binomial with n − 1 attempts and probability R
of success. That would lead to a normal distribution, nar-
rowly concentrated close to its mean R, in place of the beta
distribution above. Our result reveals a strong dependency
structure among lineages, producing the beta distribution,
with a standard deviation comparable to its mean, and a tail
that decays slowly compared to a Gaussian distribution. As
a consequence, fitness functions that are large only when the
fraction of types A in a group is above a threshold value, as
in the IPG, will allow for proliferation of types A under levels
of relatedness substantially lower than that predicted under
the assumption in [31]. We will refer to the fact that the frac-
tion of group members that are IBD to a focal individual has
a non-vanishing standard deviation, even when selection is
weak and groups are large, as persistence of variability. This
phenomenon poses a severe limitation to the applicability of
covariance-regression methods in which regression of fitness
on genotype is replaced with derivatives, as in [18], [16] (Box
6), [7] (condition (6.7)). Both the assumptions in [31], or in
[18] applied to the IPG would have implied incorrectly that
when selection is weak and groups are large, types A could
only invade the population when rare if R > C/B (these com-
putations are presented in the SI Appendix (Sections 8 and
9)). In a companion paper [58] we show that methodologies in
which one expresses the fitness of a focal individual in terms of
partial derivatives with respect to the focal individual’s phe-
notype and the phenotype of the individuals with whom the
focal interacts, as in [3, 7, 16, 18, 45, 47], require v˜Ax to be a
linear function of x.
For the PG, (2) and (3) clearly reduce to the well known
∆p = pδ(−C + BR). The same is also true for the more
general (1), as was shown in [21], where in case of strong
selection the relatedness R depends on the payoff functions.
In contrast, if we are under the conditions of (3) with v˜Ax =
−C +Bx+B2x
2 + ...+Blx
l, then
∆p = p δ (−C +BR+B2R2 + ...+BlRl), [4]
where Rl = l!R
l/[((l−1)R+1)((l−2)R+1) · · · (R+1)] is the
l-th moment of the beta distribution.
For the IPG, v˜Ax = −C + Bx, if 0 ≤ x < α, and
v˜Ax = (−C + Bx)T , if α ≤ x ≤ 1. The viability condi-
tion derived from (3) can be analyzed in detail, by simple,
but long, computations, presented in the SI Appendix (Sec-
tion 8). In the case α = C/B, the viability condition reads
C/B − R > (T − 1)R(1 − C/B)1/R. When T is large, this
yields the following approximation for the critical relatedness
R = FST :
R =
− ln(1− C/B)
lnT
. [5]
If also C/B << 1, then
R =
C/B
lnT
=
C/B
2.3 log10 T
. [6]
The simplicity and transparency of (5) and (6) illustrate the
power of (3), and Fig. 2 shows how well they compare to the
more general, but less transparent (1). Note also how (5) and
(6) provide a direct grasp on the effect of the number of rep-
etitions in the game, and a nice comparison between the PG
and the IPG. Both Fig. 2 and (6) show that alleles that pro-
mote contingent cooperative behavior, which is discontinued
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when participation is low, can spread under levels of genetic
relatedness ( = FST ) more than 5 times smaller than C/B.
This mechanism should, therefore, be seriously investigated as
a possible route for the proliferation of altruistic/cooperative
behavior.
7. Conclusions
1. Natural selection in group structured populations is best
analyzed by a combination of group-centric and gene-
centric perspectives and methods. Both shed light, carry
intuition and provide computational power, in different
ways. Rigorous mathematical analysis of models is nec-
essary, especially when fitness functions are non-linear, to
assess the validity of non-rigorous approaches.
2. Contingent forms of group altruism that are discontinued
when participation is low can proliferate under biologically
realistic conditions. Their role in the spread of altruism
should be empirically investigated.
3. Natural selection can promote traits that (in net terms over
a full life-cycle) are costly to the actors and beneficial to
the other members of their group, under demographic con-
ditions that are not stringent. This can happen in large
groups and with realistically high levels of gene flow. Ex-
cessive focus on one-shot linear public goods games in the
literature has obscured this fact.
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